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Summary One of the major challenges for mod-
ern medicine is our ageing society and an increased
level of immunocompromised hosts. More invasive
and intensive medical interventions will increase the
number of healthcare-associated infections (HCAI),
which means infection that occur because of or in
concomitance, but in any case, during or after health-
care interventions. Such infections are caused usually
endogenously from microbial components of the
patient’s own microbiome. Usually, the microorgan-
isms of the microbiome show a natural resistance
against a few antibiotics. Due to selection processes
and epidemic transmission of specific clones, mi-
croorganisms that have become resistant to multiple
antibiotics become part of the patient’s microbiome
and can subsequently cause infections that are diffi-
cult or even impossible to treat. The kind of infections
that will occur depends on diverse factors. Already
today, according to Cassini et al., 2,609,911 new cases
of HCAI occur every year in the European Union and
European Economic Area (EU/EEA). The cumulative
burden of the six HAIs was estimated at 501 disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs) per 100,000 general popu-
lation each year in the EU/EEA. In a recent publica-
tion, 426,277 healthcare-associated infections caused
by antimicrobial resistant microorganisms were cal-
culated to occur in the EU every year. Attributable
deaths in the EU due to antimicrobial resistant mi-
croorganisms were estimated to be 33,110 per year.
We know that we cannot prevent all HCAI. Because
medical innovations will allow for an increased num-
ber of novel treatments that will comprise abiotic
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materials, microorganisms will adapt to this envi-
ronment and enhance the risk for new HCAI. The
challenge for the future will not be to try to prevent
all infections, as some of them will remain unavoid-
able, but to prevent the occurrence of non-treatable
microorganisms that would make unavoidable in-
fections additionally untreatable. That means that
we need to reflect on how we organize infection
prevention, diagnostics and control. While patients
with classical infectious diseases present with infec-
tious diseases (ID)-specific symptoms, patients with
HCAI present usually with another underlying dis-
ease. HCAI are therefore perceived as a secondary
damage not following classical clinical and epidemi-
ological rules. However, more recently we have to
consider how we should react to HCAI and antimi-
crobial resistance (AMR) as they are quite different in
epidemiology and transmission behavior than classi-
cal infectious diseases. Today, the prevalence of AMR
is rising all over Europe. Although good success has
been seen in many countries, methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) remains an important
challenge for many countries. In addition to MRSA,
multidrug-resistant Escherichia coli and carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae are becoming a problem
of public health importance. Furthermore, we need
to focus more on implementation of known infection
prevention measures than trying to solve the problem
by observing and describing it. However, in addi-
tion to medical factors such as antibiotic use, hand
hygiene etc., we tend to forget that there are factors
behind these factors that have a major influence and
are found in the structures of our different healthcare
systems. We need to look more at the context before
we try to implement prevention measures and need
to learn from each other. A common goal to tackle
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) by
2030 would be an important step to foster collab-
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oration across Europe. As the current funding and
remmuneration system does not sufficiently support
prevention of HCAI and AMR, it is time for the devel-
opment of a less production- but more prevention-
economic financing system for clinical microbiology
and infection control.
Keywords Healthcare associated infections · Antimi-
crobial resistance · Prevention-economics · Transmis-
sion · Network medicine
Introduction
Healthcare-associated infections (HCAI) due to mi-
croorganisms that are antimicrobial resistant are to-
day one of the most important challenges for mod-
ern medicine. Up to 2,609,911 new cases of HCAI
occur every year in the European Union and Euro-
pean Economic Area (EU/EEA) [1]. The cumulative
burden of the six HCAIs was estimated at 501 dis-
ability-adjusted life years (DALYs) per 100,000 gen-
eral population each year in EU/EEA [1]. In a re-
cent publication, 426,277 healthcare-associated infec-
tions caused by antimicrobial resistant microorgan-
isms were calculated to occur in the EU every year
[2]. Attributable deaths in the EU due to antimicro-
bial resistant microorganisms were estimated to be
33,110 per year [2]. At the same time, prevalence of
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is rising all over Eu-
rope. Although, good success has been reported for
many countries, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) remains an important challenge Eu-
rope-wide [2]. In addition to MRSA, multidrug-re-
sistant Escherichia coli [2] and carbapenem-resistant
Enterobacteriaceae are rapidly becoming a problem of
public health importance [3]. It is necessary to clar-
ify that there is an important difference in the trans-
mission dynamics between microorganisms causing
classical infectious diseases and multidrug resistant
microorganisms (MDRO). Different from classical in-
fectious diseases (e.g. measles, tuberculosis, malaria),
HCAI due to antibiotic resistant microorganisms do
not present a defined incubation period, shedder or
carrier time, nor do they follow the natural transmis-
sion routes (airborne or contact-droplet) as found in
the textbooks. This is because the medical environ-
ment as well as novel medical interventions form in-
fection sources and transmission ways that have not
been described before (e.g. endoscopes, air-flow, new
medical devices, structural merging of clinical depart-
ments). Furthermore, in classical infectious disease
epidemiology one can draw rather unambiguous con-
clusions in case of an outbreak looking at person-,
time- and place-related data with a specific disease.
In a world of HCAI and AMR, time, place and person
data are just not enough to understand the epidemi-
ology. In addition to the three parameters, data of the
causative microorganisms on a species or better on
a subspecies level (molecular or genetic subtype) is
needed to be able to define an outbreak and under-
stand the transmission route, which enables to iden-
tify efficient intervention points for infection control.
To make it very clear, MDRO are hardly transmit-
table, unless certain factors coincide at the same time.
The most important difference lies e.g. in the dis-
position factors for AMR causing HCAI. The dispo-
sition is in general a combination of susceptibility
of the host and the virulence of the respective mi-
croorganism. While in classical infectious diseases the
exposition is usually exogenous and caused by obli-
gate pathogens for humans, HCAI are often caused
endogenously by mesophilic, facultative pathogenic
microorganisms. The proper disposition for an infec-
tion is therefore in first instance not only depending
on the immune system, but on two additional fac-
tors. The disposition of such a mesophilic facultative
pathogenic microorganism is not only to reach the
skin/mucosa of another host, but first to exogenously
colonize the new host. This sounds trivial, but is a cru-
cial prerequisite that is often forgotten. It means that
it needs to convert from a sort of short-term contam-
ination to long-term colonization. However, the con-
version into long-term colonization is not fully un-
derstood, but in addition to traditional risk factors for
an infection determined by host factors such as surgi-
cal wounds, foreign bodies as well as the virulence of
the microorganism (e.g. adhesins, type III secretion
systems), seem to be important risk factors. These
include an “inflammation prone” micro-environment
(e.g. ulcers, atopic dermatitis), but in first instance
the selection pressure due to antibiotics with sub-in-
hibitory concentrations mostly on mucosal surfaces.
The second important step is to cause an endoge-
nous infection. For this, healthcare-related factors
such as implants and insertion of biofilm-forming
medical devices, invasive medical interventions and
a changing micro-environment are important risk
factors. Only beyond these two steps, i. e. conversion
to long-term colonization and intervention-related
infection, the lack of a proper immune system be-
comes relevant for a subsequent invasive infection.
This means that pure exposure to AMR is one impor-
tant conditio sine qua non, but not a direct risk. In
a world where exposure to AMR cannot be avoided
any more, focus should lie on prevention of long-
term colonization and subsequent invasive or non-
invasive infection. However, in modern healthcare, all
exposure and disposition steps accumulate and can
create a “perfect storm” for the transmission of AMR
as well as subsequent occurrence of HCAI. Under
these man-made conditions, MDROs become in fact
transmittable from human to human.
How to respond to all this? One way is to develop
novel antibiotics, not knowing whether there are still
enough new antibiotic mechanisms to be detected,
but knowing that introduction of new antibiotics in
the past mainly triggered new resistance again. The
second approach is to focus on avoiding long-term
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Prevention goal
As the major preventive goal is to prevent infections
and maintain optimal antimicrobial treatment, we
consequently need to prevent all avoidable HCAI
but especially keep the non-avoidable infections at
least treatable. This is possible through preventing
the spread of MDRO as well as nonorganism-based
AMR avoiding long-term colonization of the hu-
man population. Otherwise, a situation could
be reached were we will see non-avoidable and
non-treatable HCAI. Something we must not allow
to occur.
colonization of humans at the wrong moment, when
they have plenty of risk factors for developing an in-
fection. Here, avoiding the spread of specific MDRO
becomes a preventive step to maintain prevalence be-
neath the epidemic threshold. Often it is believed that
especially hand and/or environmental hygiene and/or
single-room isolation in combination with personal
protective equipment can solve the problem. This is
unfortunately not the case. Our data and experience
show that a solution lies far beyond and requires mul-
tiple and complex interventions as discussed below.
There is a fire in our house
Imagine that there is a fire in the house you are living
in, in one or two of the apartments. Would not every-
body be alerted and start helping our neighbor to stop
the fire. We would know that the fire will reach our
own apartment, too. Even if we would try to close our
doors and prefer not to look at the apartments in fire.
Instead, in Europe today with respect to AMR, the lat-
ter seems happening. The fire stands for multi-drug
resistant organisms (MDRO), namely methicillin-re-
sistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-
resistant enterococci (VRE), but especially carbapene-
mase-producingmicroorganisms belonging to the En-
terobacteriaceae or to non-fermenting gram-negative
bacteria, such as Acinetobacter baumannii or Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa. They have reached the hospi-
tals of our European Union and are spreading in our
neighboring countries while we are looking at it and
continue describing the problem or are just trying
to produce new antimicrobial agents. I strongly be-
lieve that we should start implementing prevention
activities at all levels of healthcare in all countries.
We should start doing it by mutual and multi-disci-
plinary collaboration following the real-life transmis-
sion ways. This would require a new awareness of
the need to prevent AMR and non-treatable HCAI by




The Netherlands and Scandinavian countries are of-
ten considered to be an example for other countries,
at least when it comes to the prevention of AMR. In
fact, looking at the prevalence of multi-drug resistant
microorganisms those countries have been for the last
15 years green islands in Europe. At the end of the
1990s MRSA and VRE were the only major MDRO
threats in Europe and the Netherlands did very well
in the eyes of the rest of Europe.
In 2005, the situation had changed. Since 2010,
the Netherlands registers colonization and invasive
infections with extended-spectrum beta-lactamases
(ESBL) producers (mainly Escherichia coli and Kleb-
siella pneumoniae) as well as large outbreaks due to
vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE). We could
show that already 1–6% of all patients admitted to
care institutions are colonized with VRE or ESBL [4].
Especially ESBL prevalence has an impact on the
empirical use of antibiotics in healthcare institutions
and could be one plausible explanation for the grad-
ual increase in the use of carbapenems (NethMap
2016) in the Netherlands since 2004. The cumulative
direct selection pressure favouring carbapenem resis-
tance is increasing. Recent and pan-European data by
Grundmann et al. [3] showed that in most European
countries interregional distribution is already ongo-
ing and in several Southern and Eastern European
countries an endemic level has been reached. But
also countries as the Netherlands report sporadically
occurring outbreaks, almost always due to imports
from abroad (e.g. after holidays or transfer from
patients from abroad). Allowing an endemic level
of carbapenem-resistant microorganisms (CR-MO,
i.e. CRE and CR-nonfermenters) would dramatically
worsen the treatment options for patients. The prac-
tical use of essential new antibiotics is still too far in
the future and antibiotics remain an uncertain factor
because of new resistance. Because of the above men-
tioned, the most important preventive task is a “zero
tolerance policy” for the occurrence of nosocomial
infections caused by MDRO and CR-MO. This asks
to prevent the import, colonization or further spread
of this group of bacteria. The aim is to keep part
of Europe in the year 2030 still green with respect
to invasive CR-MO infections that are contracted in
the country itself. At the same time, we will need to
strengthen efforts in other European countries with
medium- and high-level prevalence of CR-MO and
start a roll-back intervention.
Roll-back strategy: invert your outbreak manage-
ment
In an endemic situation, aiming for a decrease in
prevalence needs another approach than the one we
have been following for the last decade, focusing on
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describing the problemmore that on acting against it.
This is especially true in the countries where MDRO
have become endemic. Of course, microbiological di-
agnostics needs to be performed, not only for pre-
ventive screening, but especially from clinical mate-
rial, as in practice many MDRO are identified during
healthcare. This means that clinical microbiological
analysis and results become prerequisite. In any case,
MDRO should not be transmitted from patient to pa-
tient under standard healthcare conditions and ex-
tended infection control measures need to be imple-
mented. Hospitals should therefore make a decision
and focus on their most important CR-MO, i.e. the
strain that is most endemic in their specific hospital
and region. This needs to be done by subtyping to
establish which CR-MO subtype will be taken into the
focus with the goal to decrease prevalence of this spe-
cific strain within the next few months or years. For
all the other strains, standard procedure continues.
This kind of inverted outbreak management needs bi-
or multilateral collaboration between expert groups
across Europe.
Ad hoc outbreak-specific diagnostics
To be successful we need to invert the known pro-
cess of our outbreak management. Today, in case of
a suspected outbreak, screening is started among pre-
sumably exposed contact-patients, so we identify car-
riers performing microbiological diagnostics on clini-
cal specimens, which stops at identification at species
level comprising the resistance pattern. Because of
the un-specificity of this procedure we find not only
the outbreak strain, but also other strains and depend-
ing on themethod used even otherMDRObacteria. As
a consequence, we need to react with infection con-
trol measures in patients carrying other MDRO and
are forced to subtype the strains of the same species
and the same resistance pattern. Depending on the
technology, method and laboratory used for typing,
one gets the information of who epidemiologically
belongs to the outbreak and who does not days to
weeks later. This procedure is far too cumbersome,
slow and not acceptable any more. Instead of screen-
ing first, then identify and then type, we should first
type using whole genome sequencing and develop ad
hoc a diagnostic test (e.g. multiplex-PCR[Polymerase
Chain Reaction]) that identifies on a subspecies-level
only the strain responsible for the outbreak at this very
moment. This can realistically be done today within
five working days. Once the outbreak specific-PCR
has been obtained, patients can be screened in each
healthcare institution on a large scale and because of
the high specificity on a subspecies level, even pool-
ing of clinical swabs from different patients (e.g. from
same room) and iterative screening (e.g. twice a week)
is feasible and cost-efficient. Furthermore, the ad-hoc
test can be provided to other laboratories in the each
healthcare region, so they can specifically search for
the outbreak strain. The major advantage is that there
is no screening-related “bycatch” anymore, no other,
sporadic CR-MO, no ESBL, no VRE that would trig-
ger additional preventive measures and could lead to
“infection-control fatigue” in the clinical departments.
After the roll-back program has been successful, the
region decides on the next most important endemic/
outbreak strain to be tackled and so on. This could
also be the way for high-endemic countries to start
decreasing the prevalence of CR-MO which is often
a conglomerate of different epidemic strains circulat-
ing in a region or whole country.
Regional AMR-prevention networks: the hubs
make the difference
We usually believe that MDRO are transmitted from
humans to humans and transmission needs to be
stopped. But in reality, the most important transmis-
sion way for MDRO is just following the movement
of the host. This means that MDRO are in reality
mainly spreading by following their carriers within
the healthcare system. With every admission to a care
institution, transfer of MDRO can then be triggered
under the above-mentioned circumstances. Because
patients are transferred within and between health-
care institutions all the time, spread can only be
prevented if joint interventions are realized in the
whole healthcare region and by all institutions. Ad-
ditionally, different healthcare systems have different
interconnectedness with subsequent differences in
patient mobility. The structure of the system itself en-
ables more or less transmission. A calculation of the
care network allows for a prediction of the epidemi-
ologically most important hubs and most efficient
collaboration forms between hospitals [5]. In the
Netherlands, we calculated AMR-prevention regions
on the basis of patient transfer between hospitals
[5] and in 2016 the Ministry of Health implemented
ten AMR-prevention regions, based upon the net-
work analysis of patient transfer patterns. Because
healthcare is subject to constant change, all concen-
tration, specialization, fusion as well as contractual
changes can have an effect on the healthcare network
and thereby influence the risk of spreading MDRO in
a country and beyond. The way in which the most ef-
fective preventive interventions can be implemented
differs per care network. Data shows that one or more
“hub hospitals” can be found in every care region
[5]. Due to their position in the network, the hubs
have a special role in the identification and the fight
against AMR. Hubs are often more willing to build
and maintain sustainable network structures. How-
ever, the network reality shows that other than pure
medical factors seem to have major impact on the
occurrence and spread of MDRO.
S28 Control of hospital acquired infections and antimicrobial resistance in Europe: the way to go K
main topic
Look at the context
If other factors than medical ones have influence
on the prevalence of MDRO, this might be also true
for the use of antibiotics, the implementation of
hand hygiene or the microbiological diagnostic fre-
quency. In fact, cross-border studies show that there
are major structural differences between healthcare
systems of different countries [6]. Comparison be-
tween the Dutch and the German healthcare system
with respect to structures influencing the prevention
of MDRO shows that there are not only more hos-
pitals and hospital beds on the German side (3.6 in
NL vs. 8.1 in DE per 1000 inhabitants) [7], but es-
pecially much more ICU beds (6.3 in NL vs. 29.2 in
DE per 100,000 inhabitants) [8], more doctors having
their own practice (0.4 in NL vs. 1.6 in DE per 1000
inhabitants) and finally also more stationary patient
cases (9.8 in NL vs. 21.5 in DE per 100 inhabitants)
[7]. This has influence on the population exposed
to risk factors for the acquisition of MDRO as well
as on the exposure to antibiotics. If more people
undergo surgery, more people can get a surgical site
infection and receive antibiotics. The Dutch hospitals
use a mean 60% of the hospital beds whereas German
hospitals use more than 80% of their beds [9]. This
latter can have major influence on isolation capacity
and transmission probability. Furthermore, the ratio
between health care worker (HCW) and patients on
Dutch intensive care units (ICUs) is usually 1:1 up to
1:1.5, while on the German side normal ratio is 1:2
and reaches in some cases up to 1:3.6. This latter can
have major impact on the hand hygiene compliance.
Finally, there is a difference in the microbiological
diagnostic frequency between the two countries, as
in Germany most hospitals have outsourced their di-
agnostics and need to pay for each analysis, although
it might be for preventive reasons. As the majority
of Dutch hospitals have their own microbiological
laboratory or are associated to a regional microbi-
ological lab, more diagnostics—e.g. in case of an
outbreak—does not lead to substantial extra costs,
as infrastructure and personnel are already available
and consumable costs are rather low for culture-based
screenings. This facilitates the performance of pre-
ventive microbiological screenings and diagnostics.
These are just a few examples showing that structural
factors of healthcare systems can have major impact
on the medical factors that are usually considered to
be the reason for an increase in AMR and MDRO.
Integrative stewardship: the art of becoming
metacompetent
Listening to our major stakeholder, the patient, we
know he/she is asking three simple questions: (1) How
are you going to protect me today against an infec-
tion? (2) Do I have an infection and if so, what is
the cause? (3) How can I be optimally treated? The
medical professionals who can give optimal answer
to these three questions should strive for interdisci-
plinary collaboration to deliver an integrative stew-
ardship, a trias of (1) infection prevention stewardship
(IPS), (2) diagnostic stewardship (DGS) and (3) an-
timicrobial stewardship (AMS) [10]. It is important to
conclude that none of the classically existing monova-
lent medical specialist fields, such as Infectious Dis-
ease, Medical Microbiology or Hygiene are fully able
to cover all knowledge and expertise necessary in to-
day’s complexity of AMR and HCAI in large centers.
On the other hand, in regular hospitals, a specialist
would be needed who is polyvalent and covers some
of all three expertises. This means that after having
reached the level of being competent in the own ex-
pert field we need to go beyond our “own” specializa-
tion and department in order to become metacompe-
tent within a larger collaborative organization specific
for the patient groups in the local or regional working
environment. In the end, as MDROs know no bor-
der, European training of professionals is necessary
to show that different interventions are possible for
the same goals in different countries and healthcare
systems. We need to learn how to implement pre-
vention within different socio-economic backgrounds
and within different healthcare structures. The Eu-
ropean Committee on Infection Control of the Euro-
pean Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious
Disease (ESCMID) initiated in 2018 the first two-year
course on Infection Prevention and Control [11]. This
training includes specifically the development of Eu-
ropean competence and metacompetence in infec-
tion prevention and control.
Prevention-economic model
For historical reasons, today’s financing system of
Medical Microbiology and Infection Control is mainly
based on a production-economic model in most
countries. Interestingly, although in addition to di-
agnostics, two more core activities, such as infection
prevention (diagnostics) and antimicrobial steward-
ship, have become important pillars in daily work,
but are currently handled as overhead costs and are
usually not funded by the health insurance systems.
This has several disadvantages. Frequency of mi-
crobiological diagnostics is low as it is often seen
as an unnecessary cost. In many healthcare refund-
ing systems, it is even economically advantageous
for a diagnostic lab, when there are many MDRO
outbreaks because of an increase in lab production
activity, leading even in some settings to a positive—at
least economic—incentive for more MDRO.
Alternative costing models are needed to promote
quality of care while at the same time stimulating in-
novation and efficiency. This includes e.g.
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 regional prevention budgets (system allowance) for
the regional AMR-prevention networks, based on
clear quality criteria,
 a financial incentive for rapid diagnostic in acute-
care hospitals, i. e. the faster a result is produced,
the more economic it is and not as it is at the mo-
ment that the faster a test the higher the cost for the
laboratory,
 prevention-fostering reimbursement following an
insurance model whereby healthcare institutions
could insure the losses of production during an out-
break (e.g. full refunding of a blocked bed due to
isolation). This insurance would require specific
prerequisites comprising clinical microbiology, in-
fection control expertise, screening, hand hygiene,
etc. A risk assessment based on the risk profile
(healthcare infections, hand hygiene, etc.) provides
a continuous financial incentive for quality as it
would have an influence on the premium to be paid
by the healthcare institution. With rising numbers
of outbreaks and low infection prevention perfor-
mance, the premium for the hospital rises in the
following year.
 Integrated cost models for diagnostics within the
price of the antibiotics. Just like in oncological
chemotherapy of breast cancer, which can only be
reimbursed if the herceptin receptor has been deter-
mined in advance. The same could be implemented
for certain infections (e.g. urinary tract infection,
sepsis, pneumonia), so that antibiotic therapy can
only be financed when combined with diagnostics,
as antibiotic chemotherapy cannot be performed
without having analyzed its effectiveness in paral-
lel. This would require further development of rapid
and on-site diagnostic tools.
Conclusion
Instead of continuing to describe the problem, we
need to focus on the context given by each health-
care system before we try to implement prevention
measures which means that we need to learn from
each other in order to be able to start acting to roll-
back AMR where it has become endemic. As refund-
ing presently seems to fail in giving support to preven-
tion of HCAI and AMR, it is time for the development
of a less production- but more prevention-economic
financing system for clinical microbiology and infec-
tion control. A common goal to tackle carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) by 2030 would be
an important step to foster collaboration across Eu-
rope.
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